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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sec § 78-2a-(3) (2) (i) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the Appellee's Statement of Issues and Standard of
Review is agreed upon as is set forth in Appellant's Brief, page
2, and therefore, shall not be set forth separately in this
Brief.

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A. Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Ann.,: *When a decree of
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations and
parties."

B. Section 30-3-5(7), Utah Code Ann.: (a) The Court shall
consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient
-2-

spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;

C. Section 30-3-5(7), Utah Code Ann.: (d) The Court may,
under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married on September 4, 1964. Although they
had five children, all children were emancipated prior to the
parties separation. At the time of trial, Petitioner PJeanny")
was employed by the Bureau of Land Management. Petitioner
submitted to the Court a 1999 tax return (Exh. 6) and a recent
pay check stub to verify her income (Exh. 5) . Petitioner also
testified to the accuracy of her income (Tr. 28) . Petitioner
earned approximately $2,274.00 per month.
Respondent (* Johnny") was employed as a cabinet maker.
Respondent testified that she earned approximately $4,507.00 per
month (Tr. 73) . The Respondent did not submit to the Court any
tax return. He did not submit any pay check stub, nor any other
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proof of his income, except for his testimony-

That difference between the parties income is $2,233.00 per
month.
The parties divorce was bifurcated on December 17, 1999 and
trial was held on July 6, 2000.

At trial, the parties stipulated

to a partial division of real and personal property and five
issues were heard by the trial court;
a. Petitioner's request for an eight acre parcel of the
farm property awarded to Petitioner;
b. the division of remaining retirement assets because
the Respondent has liquidated his retirement assets, while the
case was pending;
c. disposition of a bank account with approximately
$10,000.00 remaining;
d. Petitioner's alimony request, and;
e. attorney's fees
The Court made an equitable division of the real and
personal property, and did not favor either party•

The Court

gave the Respondent a credit in the amount of $33,400.00 against
his alimony obligation in order to equalize the real and personal
property division, thus equalizing the division of the real and
personal property.
The Court ordered the Respondent to pay $1,000.00 to
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Petitioner as for alimony for a period of ten years, even though
the parties were married for over 35 years.
The Court awarded each party their own retirement accounts.
The Petitioner was awarded a Thrift Savings Account with
$51,383.00 as the approximate balance and an anticipated pension
of $150.00 per month.
The Respondent liquidated most of his retirement funds, for
ten years work, and spent the funds following the parties'
separation and prior to the bifurcated divorce (Tr. 95).
Respondent provided no accounting or exhibits to justify his
expenditures.
The Court awarded the Petitioner $2,500.00 in attorney's
fees.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Argument 1:
The Court did not abuse it's discretion in awarding
Petitioner $1,000.00 per month, as for alimony, for a period of
ten years.
SUMMARY PARAGRAPH:
Respondent concedes both that he has the ability to pay
alimony and that the Petitioner does not earn enough from her
employment to meet her monthly expenses. Respondent does not
agree with the amount of alimony ordered. However, the trial
court examined all relevant factors and concluded that the
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Petitioner was in need of alimony in the amount of $1,000.00 per
month,

in order to maintain the standard of living enjoyed

during the parities marriage.

Argument 2.
The Court did not abuse it's discretion in,dividing the
retirement assets.
SUMMARY PARAGRAPH:
The trial court properly awarded the Petitioner a greater
percentage share of the retirement account than the Respondent
because it considered the special circumstances existing in the
parties marriage.

Argument 3.
3. The Court did not abuse it's discretion bv ordering the
Respondent to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees. In addition, the
Petitioner should be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal.
SUMMARY PARAGRAPH:
The trial court considered the reasonableness of the Petitioner's
fees, her need for an award of fees, including her ability to
earn an income, as well as the Respondent's ability to earn an
income and properly awarded the Petitioner $2,500.00 in
attorney's fees.
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ARGUMENT
1. The Court did not abuse itfs discretion in awarding
Petitioner $1,000.00 per month, as for alimony, for a period of
ten vears>
Respondent concedes his ability to pay alimony.
(Respondent's Brief at page 6).
Utah courts have held that "an alimony award should, after a
marriage . . . and to the extent possible, equalize the parties1
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P,2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988);
see also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Roberts
v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah App. 1992); Bell v. Bell,
810 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1991).
The trial court attempted to equalize the parties respective
standard of living by awarding Jeanny alimony. During the
marriage both parties worked. The Court examined the issue of the
standard of living during marriage and each parties7 ability to
earn enough to maintain the standard of living that the parties
both enjoyed during marriage. The Court found that the
Respondent's ability to earn money was much greater than the
Petitioner's (Tr 125). The Court made this finding based upon
the Respondent's testimony alone, because the Respondent
presented no pay check stubs to prove how much greater his income
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amount ordered was an abuse of discretion.

Considering that the

trial court found the Petitioner's testimony and presentation to
be more credible evidence than Respondent's, the trial court's
alimony award to Petitioner in the amount of $1,000.00 per month
does not appear to constitute an abuse of discretion.

While the

Respondent presented arguments which dispute the Petitioner's
financial declaration, the trial court ruled that it found
Petitioner's testimony more credible. The Petitioner testified
(Tr. 70) that she needed at least $2,100.00 per month and that
she netted only $1,369.51 per month, leaving her with a shortfall
of $730.00. Respondent claims that the Petitioner's monthly needs
should

not include the monthly farm payment she made. Even

allowing for the Respondent's argument, the trial court heard all
the evidence and still found that the Petitioner was entitled to
$1,000.00 per month as for alimony for a period of 10 years.
Given the 35 year length of the marriage this was not an
abuse of discretion.

The total award of alimony was considered

by the court when the trial court found that the Respondent
should have the option of paying a one-time lump sum payment as
for alimony. (See Findings of Fact, page 4, paragraph 9. Fund in
Respondent's Addendum)
In Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306, (Ut. Ct. App. 1999), the Utah
Court of Appeals held:
In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the
amount, a trial court must consider the needs of the recipient
-9-
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The Respondent admits his ability to pay alimony, and admits
the Petitioner's need. Respondent has failed to assert that any
serious inequity has resulted, due to the award to the Petitioner
of $1,000.00 per month in alimony for ten years, that would
manifest a "'clear abuse of discretion/'

Id.

2. The Court did not abuse it's discretion in dividing the
retirement assets.
The Respondent disposed of most of his retirement accounts
prior to trial (Tr. 86). Respondent was given credit for the
accounts which he cashed out, which included his 401-K account
with the state of Utah, in the amount of $6,730.95 and for his
account at Horace Mann annuity in the amount of $5,765.80. These
two amounts total $12,496.75.

Respondent was also awarded the

amount of $6,100.00 as for an * additional credit" against the
American Express IDS account, for a total retirement credits of
$18,596.75.
The Respondent was also awarded his entire interest in the
*Utah Retirement Systems Pension". (See Findings of Fact, at
paragraphs 8 and 9 which is located in Respondent's Addendum to
Brief). The exact amount of the award to Respondent is unclear
because he

presented no evidence or exhibits to document the

value of his Utah Retirement Systems Pension which he was
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Therefore, the unequal split of retirement benefits by the
trial court was not an abuse of discretion, given the special
circumstances cited by the trial court.

3. The Court did not abuse itfs discretion by ordering the
Respondent to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees. In addition, the
Petitioner should be awarded her attorneyys fees on appeal.

The Court awarded the Petitioner attorney's fees in the
amount of $2,500.00. The Court found that the fees were
reasonable (Tr. 126).
The Court found that the Respondent had the ability to earn
more than Petitioner and that the Petitioner was in need of an
award of attorney's fees, based upon the trial court's
examination

of both parties' respective incomes.

(Tr. At 126).

The award was pursuant to the three requirements set forth in
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991), which set
forth the need for

* evidence of the receiving spousefs financial

need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness
of the requested fees/'

Bell at 493.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1995), a trial court
may award attorney fees in divorce and custody proceedings.
The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests
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primarily in. the sound discretion oi the tiiaJ court. See Kei i v.
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1280, 1384 (Utah 1980).
Because the Petit5 oner was awarded attorney "' s fees by the
trial court., she should also be awarded attorneys' lees fc: he:
appeal, should she prevail. HaJ J \ , ::c . .

• \- , 3d J

1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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*

f

. *; ' •

• •

requests U a i txj-al coi 3 r tf s

decision oe a* i * i ii't-<;> .. • *. ci-imony, retirement benefits
distribution ^na a L P r ^ v ' F fees. Petitioner requests that she be
awarded, her attorney's lees jULiined i i,i dj pedJ .

DATED this C>/ da
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AM.'ENDUM
1. Utah Code Ann., Sec § 78-2a-(3) (2)(i)
2. Utah Code Ann., Sec § 30-3-5(1)
3. Utah Code Ann., Sec § 30-3-5(7) (a)
f. Utah Code Ann., Sec § 30-3-5(7) (d)

JUDICIAL CODE

78-2-7

support staff shall be established by the appellate court
administiator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Court

78-2-7.

198G

Repealed.

i98(>

78-2-7.5. S e r v i c e of sheriff t o court.
The court may at any time lequire the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the state
1988
78-2-8 t o 78-2-14

Repealed

1986,1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-l
78-2a-2
78-2a-3
78-2a-4
78-2a-5
78-2a-6

Creation — Seal
Numbei of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees
Court of Appeals jurisdiction
Review of actions by Supreme Court
Location of Court of Appeals
Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records
and information — Governmental immunity

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as t h e Court of Appeals The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal
1986

78-2a-2.

N u m b e r of j u d g e s — Terms — F u n c t i o n s —
F i l i n g fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until t h e first general election held more than three years
after t h e effective date of t h e appointment Thereafter, t h e
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following t h e
date of election A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per a n n u m oi
fraction thereof for the period served
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among t h e members of the court by majority
vote of all judges The t e r m of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected A presiding judge of
t h e Court of Appeals may serve in t h a t office no more t h a n two
successive terms The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve m t h e absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals In addition to t h e duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels,
(b) act as liaison with t h e Supreme Court,
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals, and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and t h e Judicial Council
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are t h e same as for
the Supreme Court
1988

522

78-2a-3 Court of A p p e a l s jurisdiction.
(3) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary
(a) to c a n y into effect its judgments, orders, and de
crecs, or
(b) in aid of its junsdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) the final oiders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative pioceedmgs of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Ttust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
(b) appeals from t h e district court review of
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12 1,
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record m
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony,
'
(e) appeals from a court of record m criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony,
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony,
(g) appeals from t h e orders on petitions for extraordi
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except m cases involving a first
degree or capital felony,
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity,
d) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to t h e Supreme
Court for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, m its review of agency adjudicative proceedings
1996
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s by Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court
1986
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location m Salt Lake
City The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in
any location within the state
1986
78-2a-6.

Appellate Mediation Office — P r o t e c t e d
r e c o r d s and information — G o v e r n m e n t a l immunity.
(1) Unless a more restrictive rule of court is adopted purs u a n t to Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b), information and records
relating to any matter on appeal received or generated by the
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(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the
petitioner the common necessaries of life;
(e) habitual drunkenness of the respondent;
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony;
(g) cruel treatment of the petitioner by the respondent
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental
distress to the petitioner;
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately
under a decree of separate maintenance of any state for
three consecutive years without cohabitation.
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3)(j) does
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for
separate maintenance previously granted.
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of
insanity unless:
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the
appropriate authorities of this or another state prior
to the commencement of the action; and
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent
witnesses that the insanity of the respondent is
incurable.
(b) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guardian ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respondent. A copy of the summons and complaint shall be
served on the respondent in person- or by publication, as
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the
county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of
the case and if the respondent resides out of this state,
take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and
make a defense as is just to protect the rights of the
respondent and the interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property,
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent
resides in this state, upon notice, have the respondent
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of
t h e respondent by two or more competent physicians, to
determine t h e mental condition of the respondent. For
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent
may be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be
apportioned by the court.
1997

30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife
for t h e same causes and in t h e same m a n n e r as t h e wife may
obtain a divorce from her husband.
1953

30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees —
Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3,4, or 6, and
in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case,
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The
order may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party
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is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other
party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of
the action or in the final order or judgment.
1993
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affidavit — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the
petitioner or petitioner's attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be submitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court.
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both
parties have attended the mandatory course described in
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of
course completion to the court The court may waive this
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of
the parties, if it determines course attendance and
completion are not necessary/appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials- for divorce shall be held
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree
after default of the .respondent, upon the petitioner's
affidavit.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
1997
30-3-4.1 t o 30-3-4.4.

Repealed.

1990

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of debts — Court to have continuing
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during
marriage;
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(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding
the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order
.allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
-dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
-for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the
court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision,
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under
this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
•expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court
determines that the petition was without merit and not
"asserted or defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
"actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise
court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of
minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the
marriage,
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in
determining alimony.
-(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection

(7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, m its discretion, base
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time
of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider the standard of living that existed at
the time of the marriage
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances,
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of
living.

(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change
shall be considered in dividmg the marital property and
in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earnmg capacity has been greatly enhanced through the
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived
or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the
time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances .not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court'-may not mb'dify alimony or issue a
new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (7).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent
spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer
than the number of years that the marriage existed
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage
or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony
shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to
the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony t h a t t h e former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.
1999

30-3-5.1. Provision for income withholding in child
support order.
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, it shall
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
1997

30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual
abuse — Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for
modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or

